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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Muguira appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for
credit for time served. Mr. Muguira acknowledges that the record does not contain a
certified-as-served copy of the arrest warrant issued for the Canyon County probation
violation, but asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion requesting
credit for time served on his Canyon County probation violation. Mr. Muguira asserts
that his Canyon County sentence should have been credited because: (1) he was
arrested and held in the Ada County Jail for the same charge for which the probation
violation was filed; thus, the issuance of the Canyon County warrant was due to the Ada
County crime, and (2) he was constructively served with the Canyon County arrest
warrant and such was the functional equivalent of a bench warrant.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2009, Mr. Muguira was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled
substance, marijuana, with intent to deliver. (R., pp.57-67.) The district court imposed
a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
Mr. Muguira on probation for five years. (R., pp.57-67.)
A motion for probation violation was filed in April of 2011, alleging Mr. Muguira
violated his probation by being charged with new crimes—driving without privileges and
felony DUI, drinking beer which was a violation of a term of his probation, failing to pay
his fines, fees, and costs, failing to serve his forty days on the Sheriff’s Inmate Labor
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Detail (“SILD”),1 and failing to provide documentation of completing his community
service.2 (R., pp.68-88.) Mr. Muguira was ordered to serve 86 days in jail for not
completing SILD. (R., p.104.) After Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms
and conditions of his probation, but before he was sentenced on the violations, the
State filed another probation violation report which alleged that Mr. Muguira violated the
terms of his probation by being charged with a new crime and by testing positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana. (R., pp.127-128, 130-140.) The Report of Probation
Violation was filed in September of 2011, and it also alleged that Mr. Muguira admitted
to drinking a beer. (R., pp.132-133, 139.)
Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms of his probation and his
probation was revoked, but the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Muguira for
365 days. (R., pp.148-150, 155-159.) After his rider, Mr. Muguira was placed back on
probation for four years. (R., pp.163-170.)
A few months later, another probation violation report was filed. (R., pp.171177.) The report alleged that Mr. Muguira violated the terms of his probation by being
arrested for felony DUI, by leaving his assigned judicial district without permission
where he was arrested on June 1, 2012, for DUI and booked in the Ada County Jail,
and by consuming alcohol.

(R., pp.171-177.)

The Register of Actions indicates a

Petition for Probation Violation was filed and a warrant was issued for the probation

Mr. Muguira filed an affidavit in response to the probation violation report in which he
attested that he had spoken to personnel at the SILD office and requested additional
time to complete the SILD from the district court. (R., pp.92-98.)
2 Mr. Muguira’s affidavit also included documentation of his completion of the requisite
community service. (R., pp.94-96.)
1
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violation on June 12, 2012. (R., p.8; see also Idaho Supreme Court Date Repository.)
The warrant was quashed on October 4, 2013. (R., p.182.)
On October 11, 2013, Mr. Muguira appeared on the probation violation, and was
released to his own recognizance. (R., p.188.) On November 4, 2013, Mr. Muguira
admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation and his probation
was revoked but reinstated. (R., pp.191-195.)
One month later, another probation violation was filed which alleged that
Mr. Muguira was charged with a new crime—felony eluding.3

(R., pp.196-218.)

Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation and
the district court revoked his probation and credited him with 369 days. (R., pp.234243.)
Mr. Muguira then filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a
supporting affidavit. (R., pp.244-258.) Mr. Muguira asked for credit for the time he
spent in custody of the Ada County Jail and in the Idaho Department of Correction
(“IDOC”) retained jurisdiction program.

(R., pp.246-247.)

Mr. Muguira submitted

documents in support which showed he was incarcerated in Ada County Jail from
June 1, 2012, to December 4, 2012, and again from September 24, 2013, to October 4,
2013. (R., pp.249-252.) He also submitted documents showing there was a bench
warrant issued on June 4, 2012, and showing that he was confined in IDOC facilities

Mr. Muguira had multiple cases pending during the probationary period of the Canyon
County controlled substance case. Herein, Mr. Muguira will refer to this case, Canyon
County case number 2009-15664, as the “Canyon County probation violation” case.
Mr. Muguira will refer to Ada County case number 2012-8187 as the “Ada County DUI”
case. However, Mr. Muguira was also charged with felony eluding in Canyon County
case number 2013-27527 and with felony DUI in Ada County case number 2011-4346.
(R., p.199.)

3
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from December 6, 2012, to September 24, 2013. (R., pp.253-256, 258.) On May 29,
2015, the district court denied the motion without a hearing, finding there was no
evidence that Mr. Muguira was served with the June 12, 2012 warrant for the Canyon
County probation violation. (R., pp.259-261.)
On July 10, 2015, Mr. Muguira filed a pro se Notice of Appeal from the district
court’s order. (R., pp.262-265.) An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 6,
2015. (R., pp.273-276.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Muguira’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
A.

Introduction
Mr. Muguira asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. First, the charges for which Mr. Muguira was serving jail time in
Ada County formed the basis for his Canyon County probation violation charges and the
Ada County DUI sentence was to be served concurrently with his Canyon County
probation violation. Where the same acts gave rise to both warrants for Mr. Muguira’s
arrest and concurrent sentences were imposed in the new Ada County DUI case and
the Canyon County probation violation case, Mr. Muguira was entitled to credit on each
sentence from the date Mr. Muguira was arrested for the charges resulting in the
probation violation.

Alternatively, where an arrest warrant had been issued for

Mr. Muguira on his Canyon County probation violation, the warrant was constructively
served in that Ada County Jail deputies were aware of the warrant and discussed such
with Mr. Muguria. Despite the fact that a signed copy of the warrant was apparently
never returned to the district court, such constitutes the functional equivalent of a served
bench warrant. For the reasons set forth herein, he respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given credit for time served in the amount of 490 days.
B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
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the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Muguira’s Request For Credit For
Time Served
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion

to correct the calculation of credit at any time; thus, the time the judgment is entered or
executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently made clear, “the language of I.C. §
18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this
case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the
appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). “This
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined
by the statute.4 Id.
Idaho Code § 19-2603 mandates that when a defendant has been arrested on a
bench warrant for a probation violation and the probation is subsequently revoked, “the
time of the defendant’s sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench
warrant.” I.C. § 19-2603;5 see also State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006)

While the defendant in Moore was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration, and
Mr. Muguira is seeking credit for time served pursuant to a probation violation, the
reasoning of Moore applies equally to all periods of incarceration identified in the credit
statutes.
5 At the time the district court denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, the
statute read thusly. Since that time I.C. § 19-2603 was amended, effective July 1, 2015,
and now provides, in relevant part:
4
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(holding that a probationer held on an agent’s warrant after being arrested for a new
offense was entitled to credit for time served from the date of arrest, not the date of
service of the bench warrant, as the agent’s warrant had the same effect as a bench
warrant in preventing him from being able to bond out on the new charge); State v.
Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922
P.2d 424-25 (Ct. App. 1996) (granting credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603
for pre-judgment time involuntarily served during a period of withheld judgment after
service of the “functional equivalent” of a bench warrant).
Idaho Code § 20-209A addresses credit for time served both before and after
judgment. That section provided:
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is
sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time
spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that
detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was
imposed. The time during which the person is voluntarily absent from the
penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the board of correction, or
from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or
counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced.
I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added).6 Section 20-209A thus recognizes that credit for any
time in physical custody may be awarded when the detention is merely “in connection
with the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” I.C. § 20-209A.

The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation . . .
I.C. § 19-2603 (2015).
6 At the time the district court denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, the
statute read thusly. Since that time I.C. § 20-209A was amended, effective July 1,
2015, and now provides:
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In Mr. Muguira’s case, the Register of Actions indicates that a Warrant of Arrest
for Probation Violation was issued by the district court on June 12, 2012. (R., pp.8, 185187.) Although the warrant was never returned, the Warrant of Arrest gives the “Last
Known Address” of Mr. Muguira as “ADA COUNTY JAIL, BOISE, IDAHO.” (R., p.186.)
The Petition for Probation Violation identifies, in Exhibit A, as the rules violated: (1) that
Mr. Muguira was arrested for an alleged new felony, Driving Under the Influence; and
(2) that Mr. Muguira left the Third Judicial District without permission where he was
arrested and booked in the Ada County Jail. (R., pp.171-173.)
Mr. Muguira was incarcerated from June 1, 2012, until October 4, 2013, when he
was released on probation. (R., p.246.) While serving his rider, Mr. Muguira asked the
district court to quash the warrant, presumably to avoid having the warrant served
during his period of retained jurisdiction as it was possible that Mr. Muguira would be
removed from the midst of programming to Canyon County to answer for his probation
violation charges. (R., pp.178-181.) Mr. Muguira asked the district court to quash the
warrant in a document filed on May 6, 2013, and the warrant was eventually quashed
almost five months later, on October 4, 2013. (R., pp.178-184.) The resultant period of
incarceration totaled 490 days for which Mr. Muguira requested credit in his Canyon
County case.

When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. The time during
which the person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility
under the control of the board of correction, or from the custody of an
officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or counted as a part of
the term for which he was sentenced.
I.C. § 20-209A (2015).
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1.

Mr. Muguira’s Probation Violation Allegations Were Based Upon Precisely
The Same Acts That Gave Rise To His Ada County Charges

Mr. Muguira is entitled to credit for the period of time in which he was
incarcerated on the Ada County charges, as the Canyon County probation violation
allegation was filed as a result of the Ada County offenses and subsequent
incarceration. See I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-209A.
Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs credit for time served from service of a bench
warrant for a probation violation. In State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2014),
the Idaho Court of Appeals found that I.C. § 18-309 and its “for the offense” limitation
did not apply to I.C. § 19-2603.7 However, I.C. § 20-209A also pertains to credit for time
served post-judgment.

Prior to its amendment effective July 1, 2015, it applied to

circumstances such as “after appeal” which occurs after a judgment is rendered.
Further, I.C. § 20-209A did include the “for the offense” language; thus, the two statutes
should be read in pari materia, giving credit to those incarcerated both for the new
offense that comprises the sole basis for the probation violation and for the probation
violation case.
In State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008), the Idaho Court of Appeals
reasoned that credit should be awarded both for a new criminal charge and for the
probation violation that is alleged due to the new criminal charge:
If a defendant is entitled to credit on all concurrent sentences for
prejudgment incarceration simultaneously served in a single county on
Although the Bitkoff Court held that an arrest warrant sent to a custodial state could
serve as a detainer, though the defendant would not receive credit pursuant to I.C. § 192603 unless the warrant was served, the Court also recognized the incongruity of such
a holding, noting, “We recognize the anomaly created by the distinction between the
warrant merely acting as a ‘hold,’ after which no credit would be due, and actual service
of the warrant, after which credit would be due.” Id. at 418 n.2.
7
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separate crimes, the same logic requires credit on both of McCarthy’s
sentences where his incarceration on a probation violation in the
possession case and on a new criminal charge in the delivery case were
based upon precisely the same conduct and concurrent sentences are
imposed. When it is the same acts that give rise to both warrants for the
defendant’s arrest and the confinement is served simultaneously, it cannot
be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to either case
individually.
McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 399. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled
to credit on his probation violation sentence and remanded the case back to the district
court for entry of an order granting the defendant credit for the time he was in custody
on the probation violation. Id.
Here, the charges for which Mr. Muguira was serving jail time in Ada County
formed the basis for his Canyon County probation violation charges. (R., pp.171-177.)
Mr. Muguira’s Ada County DUI sentence was to be served concurrently with his Canyon
County probation violation. (R., pp.238-241; Motion to Augment, pp.6-10.) Where the
same acts gave rise to both warrants for Mr. Muguira’s arrest and concurrent sentences
were imposed in the new Ada County DUI case and the Canyon County probation
violation case, granting credit on each sentence from the date Mr. Muguira was arrested
for the charges resulting in the probation violation is appropriate.
2.

Alternatively, The Arrest Warrant For The Probation Violation Served As
The Functional Equivalent Of A Bench Warrant

The Canyon County probation violation which resulted in the issuance of the
June 12, 2012 arrest warrant alleged Mr. Muguira had violated the terms of his
probation by being charged with a DUI in Ada County and by being incarcerated in Ada
County Jail. Thus, Mr. Muguira was being held on the functional equivalent of a bench
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warrant—due to his arrest in the Ada County case an arrest warrant had also been
issued in the Canyon County case.
Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that credit shall accrue after the service of a
bench warrant. However, although I.C. § 19-2603, only provides for credit after a bench
warrant has been served, Idaho appellate courts have found that the “functional
equivalent” of a bench warrant will also suffice to begin calculating the amount of credit
a defendant is entitled to. See Buys, 129 Idaho at 128; see also Covert, 143 Idaho at
170-171.
In State v. Buys, the Idaho Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s motion for
credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603 for pre-judgment time involuntarily
served during a period of withheld judgment. 129 Idaho at 127-28.

The Court of

Appeals noted that I.C. § 19-2603 provided that where a defendant has been arrested
and his probation revoked due to the violation, the defendant’s incarceration from the
time the bench warrant was served will count as part of the sentence. Id., 129 Idaho at
127. However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in not allowing credit for
“discretionary time” the defendant served pursuant to an order of incarceration, as the
defendant’s liberty was affected and there was no term or condition of probation
allowing for discretionary jail time. Id. The Court found that the order, which appeared
to have been drafted by and issued at the request of the defendant’s probation officer,
appeared to be the functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence
of an alleged violation of the terms of probation. Id., 129 Idaho at 128.

Notably, the

Court found that the order affected the defendant’s liberty, because, even though he
was also arrested for the new offense, he would have been eligible for release on bond
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in the new case but for the order requiring his incarceration for a period of time for the
probation violation allegation. Id. The Court therefore concluded that the order for
incarceration was in substance and effect a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest in
connection with an alleged probation violation, and he was entitled to credit for time
served under I.C. § 19-2603. Id.
The manner of service of an arrest warrant is addressed in Idaho Criminal Rule
4(h)(3) as follows:
The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer
need not have the warrant in possession at the time of the arrest, but the
officer shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible. A
telegraphic or other copy of the warrant of arrest may be used by the
officer at the time of the arrest or for the purpose of showing the warrant to
the defendant after the defendant's arrest. If the officer does not have the
warrant in possession at the time of arrest, the officer shall then inform the
defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued.
I.C.R. 4(h)(3). A warrant is returned when, “The officer executing a warrant shall make
return thereof to the issuing magistrate or any other magistrate before whom the
defendant is brought pursuant to Rule 5.” I.C.R. 4(h)(5).
Here, Mr. Muguira discussed the June 12, 2012 warrant with deputies at the Ada
County Jail during his incarceration there. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3) For reasons
unknown, the deputies either did not believe a warrant had been issued (which is belied
by the entry on the Register of Actions) or did not believe the warrant was active.
(Motion to Augment, pp.1-3) Nonetheless, I.C.R. 4(h)(3) does not require the officer to
physically hand a copy of the warrant to the arrestee, merely to show it to him after
arrest or to tell him of it at the time of the arrest. While an officer failed to file a return on
the warrant in Mr. Muguira’s case, such was not the fault of Mr. Muguira, and does not
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invalidate service, or constructive service, of the warrant. As a result, Mr. Muguira’s
arrest and incarceration on the Ada County DUI was the functional equivalent of service
of a bench warrant on the Canyon County probation violation.
Thus, Mr. Muguira asks this Court to find that he was served with the functional
equivalent of a bench warrant where he had already been arrested and was
incarcerated, a warrant of arrest was issued in the probation violation case which
specifically identified the correct location of Mr. Muguira (Ada County Jail), Mr. Muguira
knew of the existence of the warrant, his attorney knew of the warrant, Mr. Muguira
informed Ada County Jail personnel/officers of the existence of the warrant, and he
asked for the warrant to be served on him multiple times. (R., pp.185-187; Motion to
Augment, pp.1-3.) The purpose of a warrant is to inform the defendant that he is
believed to have violated a law and to inform law enforcement that the defendant should
be arrested so that he can be brought before the court to answer for the alleged
violation of the law. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at Westlaw
BLACKS (defining “warrant” as “[a] writ directing or authorizing someone to do an act,
esp. one directing a law enforcer to make an arrest, a search, or a seizure.”); see also
State v. Ligon-Bruno, 152 Idaho 274, 277 (Ct. App. 201) (“The purpose of a bench
warrant . . . is to bring the defendant before the court”). While a warrant gives law
enforcement authority to bring a suspect into custody, the purpose of a warrant has
been served if the suspect is already in custody and all persons concerned know there
is a warrant.

This is true even if a corrections officer has not signed and filed a

document identifying the date she handed the warrant to the defendant in jail.

14

According to Mr. Muguira’s letter to the district court, he was in custody at the
Ada County Jail and he repeatedly asked his trial counsel whether there was an active
warrant issued by Canyon County for a probation violation.8 (Motion to Augment, pp.13.) Where the record is clear that both the probation officer and the district court know
the correct location of the defendant (jail), and even the jail deputies were aware that
there was a warrant issued for the arrest of Mr. Muguira, the warrant had been
constructively served. For this Court to find otherwise would work an unjust result by
which Mr. Muguira would receive substantially less credit in the Canyon County
probation case, 490 days less. Ultimately, Mr. Muguira, through no fault of his own, was
placed in a situation where it was entirely up to the probation officer and/or the law
enforcement official to whom the task of serving the warrant fell, whether to serve the
warrant and return it to the district court. This lack of diligence by law enforcement
should not result in Mr. Muguira losing 16 months, or 490 days, of credit for time served.

According to Mr. Muguira, the warrant was not active until the second week of
December 2012. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.)

8
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Muguira respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 490 days.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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